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Abstract 
This paper investigates Jaynes’ “unbelievably short proof” of the 2nd law of 
thermodynamics. It assesses published criticisms of the proof and concludes that these 
criticisms miss the mark by demanding results that either import expectations of a proof 
not consistent with an information-theoretic approach, or would require assumptions not 
employed in the proof itself, as it looks only to establish a weaker conclusion. Finally, a 
weakness in the proof is identified and illustrated. This weakness stems from the fact the 
Jaynes’ assumption of unitary evolution is too strong given his perspective, rather than 
too weak to provide the desired results. 
 
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Wayne Myrvold for his comments on a draft of 
this paper.
 1. Introduction 
The cornerstone of the Jaynesian approach to statistical mechanics is the claim 
that the probability distribution associated with the statistical mechanical ensemble be 
interpreted as epistemic.1 More to the point, the approach claims that the probability 
distribution should not be thought of as an objective physical part of our ontology. 
Rather, it is generated by a privileged way of assigning a measure to one’s uncertainty or 
ignorance regarding the exact microstate of an SM system given a set of known 
constraints by means of a generalised principle of indifference known as the Maximum 
Entropy Principle (MEP). 
Briefly, the MEP prescribes an algorithm for the generation of probabilities in 
statistical mechanics through the use of a standard calculation by the technique of 
Lagrange multipliers, where one adopts the density matrix that both satisfies a set of 
thermodynamic constraints (interpreted as the phase averages of the density matrix) and 
also maximises the von Neumann (or Shannon-Weaver) entropy 
€ 
SI = −Tr ρ lnρ[ ]  (
€ 
SI = − pi ln pi
i
∑ ).     (1) 
over the relevant space of states. 
As Jaynes repeatedly emphasised, he saw the MEP as providing the foundation 
for making the best inferences possible given a state of incomplete information, and 
statistical mechanics (SM) is but a particular example of this method. As he characterised 
                                                
1 This paper is primarily formulated in terms of density matrices and unitary dynamics, 
though the paper could equivalently written in from the perspective of probability 
distributions and Hamiltonian dynamics. 
 it, the proper objective of SM is generate inferences as to how thermodynamic systems 
are likely to behave, given all the knowledge one possesses regarding their current and 
past states. 
One aspect (and indeed a very important one) of any foundational account of SM 
includes an interpretation and a demonstration of the 2nd law: we look to provide a 
statement of how the 2nd law is to be understood within a given interpretation, and to 
show how the 2nd law follows from this interpretation (if it follows at all). Although a 
clear and unproblematic statement of the content of the 2nd law is problematic (Uffink 
2001), one intuitive aspect of the content of the 2nd law is the claim that the entropy 
increases over time. In the Jaynesian vein, this is translated as the claim that given some 
thermodynamic constraints that initially generate an ensemble distribution and a 
particular thermodynamic entropy, it is a consequence of the unitary evolution of such 
systems that the predicted entropy based on the evolved thermodynamic observables 
cannot be less that the initial values. As Jaynes characterises it, the “real reason for the 
second law [is that] it is a fundamental requirement on any reproducible process that the 
phase volume W’ compatible with the final state cannot be less that the phase volume W0 
which describes our ability to reproduce the initial state” (1965, 395 emphasis original). 
This paper is an attempt to investigate Jaynes’ attempt to characterise and prove 
an ‘information-theoretic’ account of the 2nd law, in the limited sense just described. The 
next section briefly presents the proof. Section 3 discusses and evaluates some common 
criticisms that the proof is too weak in its results, which I argue demand more out of the 
proof than Jaynes either desires or feels is necessary on his conception of the 2nd law. The 
final section argues that in fact the proof is in some sense too strong in its assumptions, as 
 one is not immediately entitled to assume unitary evolution from the Jaynesian 
perspective, and absent this assumption the proof fails. 
 
2. The Unbelievably Short Proof  
This emphasis on the manipulability of physical systems is a major theme of 
Jaynes (1965). In this paper, Jaynes offers an “almost unbelievably short” proof of the 2nd 
law, derived based on his approach to SM. His proof is indeed very short, and discussion 
of the proof has focused on a more detailed exposition found in Lavis and Milligan 
(1985), which is itself cobbled together from Robertson (1966) and Hobson and Loomis 
(1968).2 
The proof considers a canonical system undergoing an adiabatic change. Define 
an arbitrary set of observables {Ω1(t), Ω2(t), Ω3(t), Ω4(t)…Ωm(t)} and suppose we have 
made a set of measurements made at t0, {ω1(t0), ω2(t0), ω3(t0), ω4(t0)…ωm(t0)}. On the 
basis of these values, we find the density matrix ρ0(t0) that maximises the information-
theoretic entropy 
€ 
SI 0( ) t0( ) = −Tr ˆ ρ0 t0( ) ln ˆ ρ0 t0( )[ ] subject to the constraints 
€ 
ωk t0( ) = Tr ˆ ρ 0 t0( ) ˆ Ω t0( )[ ],k =1....m       (2) 
and the thermodynamic entropy is given as a function of this density matrix, by 
€ 
Se 0( ) t0( ) = −kTr ˆ ρ0 t0( ) ln ˆ ρ0 t0( )[ ] .3      (3) 
                                                
2 The presentation here employs the quantum mechanical formalism, though the classical 
case has an exact analogue (e.g. Frigg 2008 169-171). 
3 This is the standard prescription according to Jaynes’ Maximum Entropy Principle. 
 Although the information-theoretic entropy and the thermodynamic entropy are 
conceptually independent, in this case they yield identical values up to Boltzmann’s 
constant. If we allow the system to evolve, at some later time t, we predict the values of 
the observables {ω1(t), ω2(t), ω3(t), ω4(t), ω5(t)…}, using 
€ 
ωk t( ) = Tr ˆ ρ 0 t( ) ˆ Ω t( )[ ],k =1....m       (4) 
Given these predicted observables, we define a new density matrix according to these 
new constraints, and subject to maximising the information-theoretic entropy (call it 
ρ(t)). 
€ 
ωk t( ) = Tr ˆ ρ t( ) ˆ Ω t( )[ ],k =1....m       (5) 
The new thermodynamic entropy is calculated according to the new density operator for 
the predicted values of the observables: 
€ 
Se t( ) = −kTr ˆ ρ t( ) ln ˆ ρ t( )[ ]       (6) 
Since 
i. 
€ 
Se 0( ) t( )  is invariant under unitary evolution. 
ii. both ρ0(t) and ρ(t) satisfy the constraints provided by the values of the 
predicted observables. 
iii. ρ(t), but not necessarily ρ0(t), maximises the information-theoretic entropy for 
the predicted values of the observables. 
It follows that
€ 
Se 0( ) t0( ) ≤ Se t( ).  
 
3. Criticism 
 It is fair to say that philosophers have been unimpressed by this proof (e.g. 
Earman 1986, Sklar 1993, Frigg 2008), and Earman has gone so far as to claim that he 
agrees that this proof is “almost unbelievably short” provided that one removes the 
‘almost’. Generally, there appear to be three main threads of criticism concerning the 
proof. 
 
Dynamical details. First, it does not provide the kind of details one would expect 
from a proof of the 2nd law, insofar as it cannot supply the values of transport 
coefficients, relaxation times, etc. Taken on its face, this objection seems to fall flat. The 
proof does not purport to provide these details, and it is hard to fault the proof for failing 
to provide them as this is not its intent. This is not to say that these details are 
uninteresting, just that they are well beyond its intended scope. Given that all that is 
assumed is that the density matrix evolves unitarily, it would be hard to imagine the 
details of the evolution would follow from this fact alone. 
Further, there are two ways to read Jaynes’ proof as demonstrating the increase of 
entropy. On the weak reading of the proof, all Jaynes demonstrates is that the entropy at 
some arbitrary later time (given unitary dynamics) will be greater than or equal to the 
entropy at the initial time. If this is all that Jaynes intends to demonstrate, he seems to be 
successful. There is no expectation that one should take the entropic values generated by 
this proof seriously, in the sense that this reading of the proof does not claim to (nor can 
it) generate specific predictions, but only shows that the entropy must increase (or be 
equal to its initial value) at some later time. But this is not the entire content of the 2nd 
law, and the worry is that the too much is missing from the proof to recover a useful 
 statement of the law. This would be the intent of a stronger proof of the 2nd law. 
 
Monotonicity. Second, the proof fails to demonstrate that the entropy increases 
monotonically. Rather, the proof only asserts that the entropy value at later times will be 
greater than the initial value of the entropy based on the values of the observables at t0; 
that is, although the proof asserts that for t1<t2, S(t0)< S(t1) and S(t0)< S(t2), it does not 
show that S(t1)< S(t2). 
Piggybacking on the previous discussion, it is hard to see how this can be a 
problem for the proof itself since again, the only dynamical assumption that enters into 
the proof is that the density matrix evolves unitarily. Further, it is even unclear as to 
whether a monotonically increasing entropy curve is a necessary or even desirable feature 
of a proof of the 2nd law. Although monotonic increase is an intuitive desideratum for the 
behaviour of entropy, there exists no consensus as to how to define the thermodynamic 
entropy in non-equilibrium contexts. The fact that the entropy described in (6) does not 
monotonically increase should not necessarily be seen as a problem. 
Moreover, there are experimentally realisable scenarios where the entropy curve 
does not monotonically increase (on an intuitive understanding of the entropy), but 
actually decreases. In the spin-echo experiments, where the entropy is associated with the 
alignment of the spins, the entropy increases until a magnetic pulse is applied to the 
system, and the entropy begins to decrease back to its initial value, in an apparent 
violation of the monotonic increase of the entropy. In such a case, Jaynes’ proof captures 
the relevant features of this phenomenon rather nicely, since at all times the entropy is 
greater than or equal to the initial entropy, though it does not increase monotonically.  
 Ridderbos (2002) and Ridderbos and Redhead (1998) suggest that the spin-echo 
experiments provide an argument for the correctness of the fine-grained Gibbs entropy, 
roughly since its constancy ensures that there is no spontaneous decrease in entropy as 
the spin states return to their original orientation.  In the Jaynesian case, we have two 
density matrices to work with, ρ and ρo, the latter describing the initial density matrix and 
the former indicating the distribution that would be used if it were constructed from the 
predicted values of the observables at a later time. Clearly, the behaviour of the matrix ρo, 
being restricted to unitary evolutions, mirrors the relevant features of the Gibbsian fine-
grained entropy to which Ridderbos and Redhead appeal. In the present context, this adds 
force to the undesirability of a proof that strictly requires monotonic entropic increase. 
Conversely, the predicted matrix identifies the entropy that would be generated had the 
matrix been generated only from contemporaneous predicted constraints, i.e. if one’s 
knowledge of the state of the system were limited to the values of those predicted 
constraints. 
Sklar (1993) exploits this distinction. He argues that the spin-echo experiments 
are actually problematic for the Jaynesian because the proof seems to suggest that we get 
an increase in entropy through the use of the matrix ρ by purposely throwing away 
information about the history of the system (contrary to Jaynes’ repeated assertions that 
we should never throw relevant information away), information that is crucial to 
providing a correct description of the spin-echo behaviour. This seems in tension with the 
proof of the 2nd law, since it suggests that there may be contexts where we might want to 
use the matrix ρo and those where it is preferable to use ρ to describe the system, 
depending on our objectives. A partial solution to this worry is to maintain a conceptual 
 separation between the experimental, thermodynamic entropy, and the information-
theoretic entropy associated with one’s knowledge of the system, the latter always being 
described by the evolution of the matrix ρo, whereas the former is at least partially 
defined by the subjunctive reading in the paragraph above.  
 
Time Step Dependence. Finally, a third criticism attempts to block an obvious 
remedy to the problem of the non-monotonic behaviour of the entropy curve (on the 
assumption that this is a genuine problem). Lavis and Milligan (1985) suggest that one 
could recover monotonic behaviour if, instead of comparing the entropy at later times 
with the entropy at the time of the initial measurements, we compare the entropy at t0 to 
t1, and then repeat the proof with t1 taken as the initial time so that it ensures S(t1)< S(t2). 
In Frigg’s words, the problem with this approach is that “it would have the disadvantage 
that the entropy curve would become dependent on the sequence of instants of time 
chosen. This seems odd even from a radically subjectivist point of view: why should the 
value of Se at a particular instant of time, depend on earlier instants of time at which we 
chose to make predictions, or worse, why should it depend on us having made any 
predictions at all?” (2008, 172) Lavis and Milligan argue that this rescue, despite these 
problems, appears unmotivated from the Jaynesian perspective, since it is assumed that 
the values of the observables at t0 are privileged, in that this is the only time that the 
values are actually measured on the system itself, rather than ‘merely inferred’. 
Here again, it is striking that such expectations are being placed on Jaynes’ proof. 
Again, it is not clear that the monotonic increase in entropy is a desideratum for the 
proof, and without any dynamical assumptions in place it is hard to see how one might 
 expect monotonicity to be shown.4 Further, Frigg, Lavis and Milligan are right to note 
that privileging certain times seems unmotivated from the Jaynesian perspective. 
Fortunately, as described above, monotonicity is neither a desired result nor to be 
expected from a proof that only relies on the unitary nature of the evolution. 
Another point of concern in Frigg’s evaluation of the proof is that the time 
dependence of this move only seems odd if we do identify the entropy predicted at later 
times with the thermodynamic entropy, which is thought to be a property of the physical 
system. Indeed, Frigg points to the strange possibility that making predictions, or even 
not making predictions, might have an effect on the system’s entropy, which is indeed an 
odd claim. It would be strange for the entropy curve to depend crucially on the seemingly 
arbitrary times at which we make predictions about the system. 
But is it the case that the entropy that figures into this proof really is the 
thermodynamic entropy? Although Jaynes seems to identify the predicted entropy with 
the thermodynamic experimental entropy, there is no demonstration that this is actually 
the case, and the entropy SI is treated as conceptually independent in the proof. Indeed, 
whether the TD entropy does match the predicted entropy depends on the details of the 
dynamics: one should not expect detailed and correct entropy curve from the assumption 
of unitary evolution alone. Indeed, the immediate inference from the information-
theoretic entropy to the experimental thermodynamic entropy is not licensed by Jaynes in 
any way. Jaynes (1963) himself argues that the information-theoretic entropy “for some 
                                                
4 In fact, Jaynes’ original presentation of the proof only looks to establish that the final, 
equilibrium entropy is greater than the initial entropy, without considering any 
intermediate values. 
 distributions and in some physical situations, has long been recognised as representing 
entropy. However, we have to emphasise that the “information-theory entropy” SI and the 
experimental thermodynamic entropy Se are entirely different concepts. Our job cannot 
be to postulate any relation between them; it is rather to deduce whatever relations we 
can from known mathematical and physical facts.” (187, emphasis original) Absent some 
set of relevant “mathematical and physical facts”, such as the details of the dynamical 
evolution, there is no reason to expect that the two entropies should match. As such, (6) is 
ambiguous: the predicted entropy Se might refer to one of two quantities. Either we take 
this quantity to be the actual predicted entropy given by a precise quantity, or as the 
weaker statement that whatever dynamics are in place, the expected experimental entropy 
will be greater than the initial entropy, without taking the proof to generate a specific 
numerical value for either the expectation values or the entropy. Given the analysis 
above, it is clear that the latter reading is to be preferred.5 Nonetheless, in the next section 
we shall see that even this reading fails. 
In sum, the expectations placed on the proof seem unreasonable, and they are 
fairly easy to diagnose. Instead of amounting to a critique of the information-theoretic 
approach on its own terms, these criticisms amount to a list of desiderata associated with 
interpreting SM as a proper physical theory, and demanding that the proof track, in all its 
gory detail, the specifics of the physical behaviour of the system. But the proof purports 
                                                
5 Spelling out the exact relation between these two entropies would surely be a difficult 
task that cannot be endeavoured here. However, I at least suggest that one component of 
this relation is given by the subjunctive, counterfactual, reading of the thermodynamic 
entropy mentioned in discussing Sklar. 
 to do no such thing, and interpreted as reflecting the physical necessity of the 2nd law, 
Jaynes’ proof is indeed wanting in numerous respects. Insofar as the proof only assumes 
unitary evolution and nothing more, it is hard to see how one could hope for a stronger 
result than the one proven: the premises of the proof are far too weak to give us 
relaxation times or a monotonic entropy curve. Without a specification of the dynamics, 
what more could be expected out of this proof than what has been given? 
However, when interpreted as a statement regarding the manipulability of such 
systems based on the values of the observables at some initial time, the proof takes a 
somewhat different light. If these probabilities are interpreted as epistemic rather than as 
a physical probability distribution (whatever the relation between these might be), the 
object of the proof is not to describe some physical necessity, but to establish a restriction 
on one’s ability to make inferences about and control the evolution of the system, given 
only the knowledge that the dynamics are unitary. Jaynes’ objective in this proof is 
limited to this: there is no reproducible or controllable way that the values of the 
thermodynamic observables can change adiabatically such that the entropy associated 
with the predicted density matrix will decrease below its initial value. 
 
4. Why Assume Unitarity? 
This does not mean that all is well with Jaynes’ proof. However, the qualm I have 
with the proof is not that the proof is too weak in its conclusions, but that its fundamental 
assumption is too strong. Jaynes’ programme is intended as a framework in which one 
makes inferences about the future state of thermodynamic systems, based on the results 
of an initial set of measurements. And although we can expect the evolution of the 
 probability distribution, construed physically, to evolve unitarily, it is unclear why the 
evolution of an epistemic probability distribution, insofar as it describes the evolution of 
our knowledge, should evolve in this way. Indeed, it would be odd for this distribution to 
evolve unitarily, mirroring the physical evolution (unless we were Laplacian demons). 
Although the proof assumes unitary evolution, and many of the criticisms discussed 
above hit on this assumption as being too weak to deliver the results desired, this 
assumption in fact seems unjustifiably strong. 
The natural counterpoint here is to defend Jaynes’ proof by observing that there is 
a difference between actually being able to evolve a probability distribution through its 
unitary evolution, such that for any initial distribution one can actually describe its time-
evolved state6, and the weaker claim that we know that the distribution, however it 
evolves, evolves unitarily. And in fact, nothing is assumed in the proof other than that the 
distribution evolves in a unitary fashion. So one should read the proof as not demanding a 
sort of Laplacian omniscience, but merely the more general observation that we know 
evolutions are unitary. Clearly, this is in the spirit of the Jaynesian approach, and perhaps 
this would vindicate the proof. 
However, this move will not work. Even though we assume the fundamental 
dynamical evolution to be unitary, this is not actually something one is entitled to assume 
in this proof. The assumption of unitary evolution is subject to an important qualification: 
                                                
6 In principle if we knew how to evolve the probability distribution exactly, we would be 
able to demonstrate the monotonic increase in entropy (presuming it is a fact), determine 
relaxation times, etc. Indeed, much research and many open questions in SM would be 
obviated if this were feasible. 
 the degrees of freedom that comprise the representation of the system must be complete. 
If there are additional physical degrees of freedom associated with the system beyond 
those that are specified, it is possible that the evolution relative to the specified known 
degrees of freedom will not appear unitary. 
From an ‘objective’ perspective, this hardly matters: unitary evolution is a 
fundamental feature of the dynamics, and if one fails to incorporate some degrees of 
freedom into the description of the system, then the description is wrong. However, from 
the Jaynesian perspective, one is only permitted to assume unitarity if one is justified in 
believing that all the physical degrees are represented in one’s description of the system, 
since it is our goal to make inferences based only on the knowledge in hand. 
To see how this is problematic, as a toy example we consider a discrete phase 
space taking on six possible microstates, and loosely based on Jaynes’ (1963) Brandeis 
dice problem. Initially, we are given an expectation value across the states of 4.5, and for 
the moment can be thought as representing the average value of the pips on a die. Jaynes 
(1979) solves this problem through the MEP method, attaining the following probability 
distribution: 
p(1)=0.054, p(2)=0.079, p(3)=0.114, p(4)= 0.166, p(5)=0.24, p(6)=0.348 (7) 
According to Jaynes, this distribution represents the maximal entropic state for the 
constraints given, and the maximal entropic state for the system, absent the constraint that 
the expectation value is 4.5, has an expectation value of 3.5 where each outcome is 
assigned equal probability. Clearly, the further the expectation value from 3.5, the lower 
the maximum entropy assigned to the system, such that 
S(x)>S(y) iff |x-3.5|<|y-3.5|       (8) 
 where x and y are the expectation values associated with some macrostate of the system. 
Now, let us specify that the system evolves by some unitary dynamics, such that 
for each discrete time step, a new state is achieved by permuting the probabilities of each 
individual microstate in some definite but unspecified way. Clearly, the informational 
entropy due to such dynamical evolution is unchanged, since this amounts to permuting 
the indices on outcomes in the Shannon-Weaver entropy. However, the expectation value 
may change through arbitrary permutations. Because the probabilities assigned by the 
MEP are monotonically increasing when x>3.5 and monotonically decreasing when 
x<3.5, the expectation value of the system is bounded under evolution since the 
permutations can only move the expectation value closer to 3.5; that is, if the initial 
expectation value was 4.5, the dynamics can only generate probability distributions with 
expectation values between 2.5 and 4.5. Thus if one constructs a new probability 
distribution on the basis of these new expectation values, the entropy associated with the 
new distribution must be greater than the entropy of the original distribution. This is the 
essence of Jaynes’ proof. 
We can see the relevant features of the proof even in this toy model. Although the 
initial entropy represents a lower bound on the entropy, it is entirely possible that the 
unspecified unitary dynamics move the system into states which move closer and further 
away from the mean value of 3.5, and thus the entropy cannot, by this method, be shown 
to increase monotonically with each time step. 
Despite the above arguments that usual criticisms of this ‘almost unbelievably 
short’ proof are misguided, there is a sense in which one needs a more robust 
characterisation of the dynamics beyond the stipulation that they are unitary. The proof 
 works because there is no way in which the expectation values can obtain values outside 
the bound described above, and this is achieved by limiting the dynamics to permutations 
of the initial probability distribution. However, if the state space is incompletely 
specified, in the sense that there are further degrees of freedom not accounted for in the 
description of the system, it is possible for the entropy relative to this description to 
decrease.  
For instance, suppose that there are additional dofs not accounted for in the phase 
space, such that (according to some ‘natural’ measure or reproducible physical 
distribution) the probability of each outcome from 1-6 is actually the marginal sum over a 
more fine-grained joint distribution where each outcome is actually associated with two 
outcomes of unequal weight. If these probabilities are permuted by some unitary 
dynamics, it is entirely possible for the expectation values (from the coarse-grained 
perspective) to, say, exceed 4.5, since it is with respect to the coarse-grained p.d. that the 
initial p.d. is generated. For instance, suppose that each microstate can be bifurcated into 
two states with different densities, such that according to the ‘natural’ measure 
p1(1)=p2(1), with p2(y)=(1/y2)p(y) and p1(y)=p(y)-p2(y) for y∈{2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. The 
resultant probabilities for this fine-grained state are as follows: 
 P1(y) P2(y) 
Px(1) 0.02718 0.02718 
Px(2) 0.05908 0.01969 
Px(3) 0.10148 0.01268 
Px(4) 0.15511 0.01034 
Px(5) 0.23018 0.00959 
Px(6) 0.33784 0.00965 
 
If the actual dynamics are given by the rule that for each time step, the states in 
the left hand column move to the right hand column, and states in the right hand column 
 move to the left hand column below it in a cyclical fashion such that p2(6)p1(1), then 
one computes the expectation value after one time step to be 4.53, which has a lower 
entropy than the initial state from the perspective of the coarse-grained description where 
the only observable defined is Y. Such examples are easy to multiply. 
This point is similar to criticisms of Jaynes’ programme that suggest that he 
tacitly relies on systems being ergodic in order to get his programme off the ground 
(Sklar 1993, Frigg 2008). In the case of ergodicity, the worry is that if the space is not 
metrically indecomposable, the phase averages associated with the density matrix may 
not equal the time averages, so that the Jaynesian method will deliver the wrong 
predictions if it cannot demonstrate the system to be ergodic. However, this worry is 
different, and perhaps more fundamental, for in the case of ergodic theory the dynamics 
are assumed to be measure preserving. In this case, if there is no guarantee of unitary 
evolution because relevant degrees of freedom are missed, one cannot even assume 
measure preservation. Nonetheless, the best response available to the Jaynesian is likely 
parallel to the one offered against the ergodic criticism: provided that one is sure the 
dynamics are unitary, the appearance of apparent entropy decreasing phenomena is an 
indication that important physical features of the system have been omitted and need to 
be found or included. As such, it should not be understood as an indictment of the 
Jaynesian progamme itself. The reader is left to decide whether this response is 
convincing. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Some common criticisms of Jayne’s unbelievably short proof have been 
 discussed. Generally, these criticisms have pointed to the fact that the proof is too weak 
in its conclusions, and any attempt to strengthen them would be unjustified from the 
Jaynesian perspective. Conversely, I have argued that the demands placed upon this proof 
are too stringent, and in fact demand more from a proof of the 2nd law than Jaynes desires 
or needs to show. However, I have suggested that there is a sense in which the proof is 
actually too strong, rather than too weak. Specifically, unless the dynamical description 
of the system is known to be complete, one is not entitled to assume the unitary evolution 
of the system relative to the description given. Without the assumption of unitarity, it is 
possible for the entropy to decrease, even if the fundamental dynamics are unitary. 
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